Conservatism may be divided into three branches – libertarian, anti-communist, and traditionalist. Some might add neo-conservatism to the list. In The Quest for Community (1953), Robert Nisbet deftly marshals the first of these three strains of thought into a coherent communitarian framework. As a rare conservative sociologist, Nisbet might be accused by some critics of maintaining an overly romanticized view of the past, with even a nostalgic tone to his writing, but even a cursory reading should refute this bunkum. Nisbet emphatically states in the preface, “I am frank in saying that I cannot find a nostalgic note in the entire book” (xxii). Nor can I. Nisbet’s work is unmistakably future-oriented despite its thorough presentation of a history of ideas.

Taking a page out of Marx’s Communist Manifesto, Nisbet remarks that a “specter is haunting the modern mind, the specter of insecurity.” With ironically Marxist undertones, Nisbet opens his analysis in part one of The Quest for Community with a diagnosis of the fundamental problem of the modern soul as a problem of alienation – alienation from past, physical place and nature, and things. The root of this alienation is the severed social bonds which once firmly tied individuals to communities. Nisbet describes this alienation, “By alienation I mean the state of mind that can find a social order remote, incomprehensible, or fraudulent; beyond real hope or desire; inviting apathy, boredom, or even hostility” (xxiii). Nisbet’s diagnosis should not be surprising since he is writing in the middle of the twentieth century as the world recovers from two devastating wars.

Lest you get the wrong impression that Nisbet was some kind of neo-Marxist, let me put that query to rest. Karl Marx was both pro-statist and anti-pluralist. Robert Nisbet was a social pluralist and was staunchly opposed to statism. Nisbet decisively criticizes Marx from a sociological perspective. Nisbet rejects Marx’s obsession with the ill-defined institution of the class, which lacks the requisite functional significance which is necessary for personal attachment. Nisbet argues that Marx’s bias in favor of class-based analysis neglects the more important institutions of “kinship, religion, gild, and State” (81). Furthermore, Nisbet descries the political centralization of the State for usurping the authority and functions of local communities. Marx, in contrast, calls upon the proletariat “to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State” in the Communist Manifesto.

Nisbet, a communitarian who opposes statism, does not laud individualism either. For those unfamiliar with the intellectual roots of conservatism, this position may seem curious for a conservative to hold. But a communitarian ethos permeates conservatism. Nisbet views atomistic individualism as a negative force in society because “Individualism has resulted in masses of normless, unattached, insecure individuals who lose even the capacity for independent, creative living” (12). People are social creatures and depend upon communities and social structures for moral certitude. For Nisbet, the two prerequisites for community are function and authority. He defines community as the “product of people working together on problems, of autonomous and collective fulfillment of internal objectives, and of the experience of living under codes of authority which have been set in large degree by the persons involved” (xxix).

Nisbet’s analysis proceeds as a descriptive assessment of the loss of community in the modern world and the lack of emergence of suitable intermediate associations to intercede between the individual and the state. It is not that traditional forms of community, based on kinship, faith, or locality have ceased to exist, but rather they have lost functional significance. Nisbet writes, “Family, local community, church, and the whole network of informal interper­sonal relationships have ceased to play a determining role in our institutional systems of mutual aid, welfare, educa­tion, recreation, and economic produc­tion and distribution” (48). In lacking functional significance, communities lose the ability to provide psychologi­cal sustenance of “allegiance, belief, and incentive” to individuals (51).

Nisbet is at his best – in the second part of his analysis – in recounting the history of ideas that lead to the fateful mix of modern liberalism and twentieth century authoritarianism. Nisbet high­lights three main political philosophers whose ideas on sovereignty reflect a fateful progression of thought between 1500 and 1800.

The first political philosopher – Jean Bodin, author of On Sovereignty – makes the case for legal monism but with a sharp distinction between State and society. The State should merely be a sovereign referee to resolve disputes between elements within society. Soci­ety is comprised of the intermediate associations and communities, such as family, church, and corporation. Bodin hews out a sphere of privilege for these intermediate communities, which are the basis of order in society, even though they are always subject to the sovereign power of the State.

The next political philosopher is Thomas Hobbes, author of Leviathan, who contends that the sovereign State is the source of order in society. Nisbet points out that Hobbes denies “any pre-political order of society based upon kinship, religion, and other asso­ciations within which the sociability of man is nourished” (119). At the same time as Hobbes spurns the relevance of intermediate associations and rejects the importance of pluralism and local­ism, Hobbes does not advocate the supreme State as the ultimate aspira­tion. Rather Hobbes regards the indi­vidual as preeminent. Hobbes provides a thoroughgoing articulation of West­ern individualism, which sets the stage for John Locke to extend the rights of individuals. But from Nisbet’s perspec­tive, Locke is a derivative thinker of Hobbes.

The next political philosopher who offers a significant progression in the philosophy of sovereignty is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, author of Emile and the Social Contract. Rousseau argues that the goal of the State is to eman­cipate individuals from the oppressive chains of society. The role of the State takes an Orwellian turn in the follow­ing passage from Rousseau: “In order that the social contract shall be no empty formula it tacitly implies that the obligation which alone can give force to all the others: namely that any­one who refuses obedience to the Gen­eral Will is forced to it by the whole body. This merely means that he is being compelled to be free.” Intermedi­ate associations no longer have a role in the lives of individuals because they are seen to be oppressive constraints on individuals. This idealized view of society is one in which atomistic indi­viduals are “held rigidly together by the sovereign will of the State alone.” This combination of liberalism and authori­tarianism is the intellectual foundation of totalitarianism.

Totalitarianism is characterized by two components – “the existence of the masses” and the ideology of “politi­cal community” (176). By mass, Nisbet means “an aggregate of individuals who are insecure, basically lonely, and ground down, either through decree or historical circumstance, into mere par­ticles of social dust” (177). It is easier to convince unbound, rootless individuals who are unprotected by stable commu­nities to accept the ideology of a political community. The power of the quest for community in the psyches of insecure individuals is enormous. Nisbet suggests that the concept of a political commu­nity rests on the “belief that the normal plurality of authorities and functions in society must be supplanted by a unity of authority and function arising from the monistic State” (139).

Totalitarianism is a “process of the annihilation of individuality, but, in more fundamental terms, it is the annihi­lation, first, of those social relationships within which individuality develops” (179). The role of intermediate associa­tions in creating a sense of meaning for individuals is crucial to prevent against the ravaging effects of totalitarianism. Nisbet here calls attention to the two most heinous totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century: Nazi Germany and the Communist Soviet Union. Rous­seau’s notion of “freedom in confor­mity to the General Will” is in Nisbet’s view, the “root of the totalitarian view of freedom and order” (201).

Nisbet effectively shows that liberal individualism and authoritarian statism are not incompatible doctrines, but can in fact combine to form a lethal com­bination of totalitarianism. The safeguard against totalitarianism is a rich cultural fabric of intermediate associations – family, profession, local community, church, university, trade union, cooperative, and mutual aid association. Interestingly, Nisbet does not extensively discuss the internal content of the intermediate associations. He appears to be somewhat indifferent on the types of institutions which should prevail, so long as some functionally significant institutions prevail. Even for an important institution like the family, Nisbet appears laissez-faire in his suggestion that there “is no single type of family, any more than there is a single type of religion, that is essential to personal security and collective prosperity” (62). The lessons about the importance of community do not purely defend against creeping totalitarianism; the lessons extend to the more positive promotion of freedom.

Nisbet continues in the third part of his analysis on community and the problem of freedom, “Genuine freedom is not based upon the negative psychology of release. Its roots are in positive acts of dedication to ends and values” (238). Nisbet believes in the necessity of voluntary intermediate organizations both for the protection of individuals and for human flourishing. Since community is characterized by authority and function, it might seem paradoxical to suggest that individuals are freer when they have joined an organization to which they have submitted to an authority. But authority is a necessary component of a functional community, which is necessary for the psychological well being of individuals. The key for Nisbet is that the authority is not absolute. Freedom “lies in the interstices of authority” (239). An individual must always have recourse to leave an organization and join a different one.

Nisbet concludes his analysis with a call for a “new philosophy of laissez faire,” one in which “the basic unit will be the social group” rather than the individual (247). The values which Nisbet extols are freedom of choice, cultural diversity, pluralism, and division of authority. Robert Nisbet fits well in the traditionalist branch of conservatism, but in some ways Nisbet’s views are not incompatible with the libertarian strain of conservatism. He clearly argues that a viable free market must be embedded in social institutions, as he writes, “Capitalism is either a system of social and moral allegiances, resting securely in institutions and voluntary associations, or it is a sand heap of disconnected particles of humanity” (215). But the emphasis on voluntary associations recognizes the primacy of liberty and individual choice, given that individuals are members of strong communities.

The Quest for Community has been called one of the top ten books that shaped conservatism in America , and indeed it should put to rest many of the pejorative stereotypes of conservatives promoting individualism to the detriment of community. It is not hyperbole to suggest that Nisbet’s masterpiece should be in the personal libraries of all students of conservatism, including liberals who might be enlightened by this classic.