Strike in Northeast Asia
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On Monday, October 9, the government of North Korea announced that it had successfully completed its first test of a nuclear weapon. The morning test, according to the communist government, was “conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100 percent” and was a “historic event.”
U.S. Geological Survey data suggested that the location of the test was in the province of North Hamgyong, inside Mant’ap-san Mountain. The magnitude of the explosion, however, has been a matter of some debate. Indeed, the uncertainty around the force of the explosion has caused observers to derive different estimates for the power of the weapon tested. Figures from half a kiloton of TNT to 15 kilotons have been suggested, although the consensus seems to be at the low end of this range and some experts believe that the test was at least a partial failure.
Whether Pyongyang is trying to gain U.S. attention, improve its negotiating position, protest the imminent election of South Korean Ban Ki-moon to the position of U.N. Secretary General, refine its weapons knowledge, or all of the above, the rhetorical reactions of the international community to the test announcement were quick and fairly consistent. The U.S., long a harsh critic of the North Korean government’s proliferation efforts, stated that it would pursue sanctions against North Korea via the U.N. Security Council’s Chapter 7 provisions. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, additionally, stated, “Japan is in [the] gravest danger…We cannot tolerate North Korea’s actions if we are to protect Japanese lives and property.” Suiting action to words, Japan acted quickly to block the importation of goods from North Korea and to refuse North Korean ships the use of Japanese ports.
South Korea and China have traditionally been more accommodating towards the regime of Kim Jong-il, but had stern words for Pyongyang in the wake of the test. China, often considered a patron of the North, condemned North Korea’s “brazen” action. South Korea put its military on alert in the wake of the test, and President Roh Moo-hyun’s spokesman called the event “disappointing and provocative.”
That the international response was this consistent is not surprising, given North Korea’s longstanding efforts to develop its nuclear program. The country decided to quit the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993, a provocation that led to a 1994 agreement between the U.S. government and the Kim regime. This agreement, the Agreed Framework, stipulated that the North Koreans would receive civilian nuclear assistance if they desisted in their weapons efforts. While the agreement seemed to work for a while, Pyongyang eventually threatened to restart its missile and nuclear programs if Washington did not meet certain demands. The U.S. government, in turn, confronted North Korea in 2002 with evidence that it had violated the Agreed Framework.
From this point, as the U.S. and its allies took a more cautious stance toward North Korea, the latter increased its saber-rattling. In 2003, North Korea test-fired missiles in the direction of Japan, withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty again, and announced the resumption of nuclear work. Two years later the country announced for the first time that it had nuclear weapons. The most recent incident before the current affair was Pyongyang’s July test firing of a barrage of missiles into the Sea of Japan.
In response to the latest North Korean provocation, the U.N. Security Council has passed a set of sanctions, adopted by a 15-0 vote. These measures mandate the cessation of North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests and stipulate that cargo bound for North Korea is to be inspected. They also demand cessation of trade in luxury goods with North Korea and the freezing of North Korean foreign assets. Although the resolution passed unanimously, usual differences showed themselves among key players. China stated that “punishment is not the purpose” of the U.N. in dealing with North Korea. Russia was likewise less fervent in support of sanctions, while Japan and the U.S. pushed particularly hard.
Along with South Korea, China does not want measures against the North Korean regime to be too successful. After all, if the Kim regime were to collapse, China would suffer some ill consequences, particularly the stream of refugees that North Korea would no longer be able to contain. Another factor that the Chinese government considers is the prospect of a united Korea. Aside from the loss of a client state (however unpredictable it may be), a united Korea would pose strategic problems, and it might provoke agitation for secession in northeastern China should enough Koreans relocate there during a regime collapse. Additionally, China’s business arrangements with the North, particularly in the area of mining, would be vulnerable to any instability caused by a regime change.
The recent test may trigger a regional arms race. Japan has extensive civilian nuclear facilities, substantial technological capability, and a growing number of voices in favor of a homegrown deterrent. The country could have nuclear weapons in a matter of months if it decided to pursue them. South Korea has experimented with nuclear development, but halted this work due to U.S. demands. The South Korean government may, if the situation with the North escalates or if Japan pursues the bomb, decide that it should not be the only player in the region without nuclear weapons.
Of more immediate concern for the United States is the effect of North Korean proliferation on Iran or non-state terrorist actors. The Bush administration has repeatedly stated that North Korea would be held accountable for any transfers to such parties. This is, in fact, the chief fear of U.S. officials, since a missile attack by North Korea is not presently technologically feasible.
In this light, the U.S. government recognizes that its actions toward North Korea need to send the right messages to Iran. The Wall Street Journal argues, “the challenge for the U.S. now is to forge a strong international consensus on punitive steps toward North Korea that might spill over into talks later on Iran.” To the extent that the sanctions against North Korea are a victory for the U.S., they send a message that North Korea has not escaped international censure despite its budding nuclear deterrent. However, the U.N. Security Council may not be able make as strong of a resolution against Iran as it has toward North Korea. Iran enjoys substantially greater trade links with the rest of the world than does North Korea.
In any case, the recent developments on the Korean peninsula make it essential for the U.S. to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Would-be nuclear states such as Iran may see invincibility against Western pressures if the West allows the Kim regime to continue in its impunity. Furthermore, as recently discussed by columnist Charles Krauthammer, the existence of two rogue nuclear states would pose a serious problem to the U.S. in the event of an anonymous nuclear attack by terrorists—as it would not be clear against what nation the U.S. could promise retaliation.
The North Korean nuclear test on October 9 raised much more than the stakes on the Korean peninsula. The future of the world’s nonproliferation agenda and the West’s ability to deal with its foremost adversaries are at a critical juncture.
