Hoover's Neoconservatism Can't Last

A recent online dust-up between Hoover Institution historian Niall Ferguson and Vice President J.D. Vance perfectly captures the fault line dividing today’s right. Out: globalism. In: America First.

This is more than a spat—it’s a symbolic battle between Hoover’s neoconservative orthodoxy and the emerging “America First” realism that now dominates the GOP. And at the core of this divide is an uncomfortable truth: The Hoover Institution hasn’t adapted to the new conservative reality.

Dr. Ferguson—and the Hoover Institution—are firmly on the side of the old. Ferguson first posted a quote from George H.W. Bush about Kuwait, implying a historical parallel to the war in Ukraine. To this, the Vice President responded with a twenty-five-hundred word retort on X, calling Ferguson’s perspective “moralistic garbage” based in “irrelevant history.”

Dr. Ferguson addressed Vice President Vance’s criticism in a Free Press column, taking swipes at the Trump administration’s Ukraine strategy, which he lambasted as a series of “unforced errors.” He was particularly alarmed by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s suggestion that Ukraine’s postwar borders would likely not be fully restored, NATO membership was off the table, and that European nations—not the U.S.—would bear the brunt of security guarantees. To Ferguson, such concessions amounted to appeasement. In other words, his argument was that it’s not “moralistic garbage” or “globalism” to insist that the US must never allow Kyiv to fall to Russia.

Just this morning, Vice President Vance again responded, denying attacks of “appeasement” in favor of practical solutions to end the nearly three-year war in Ukraine. He emphasized that the goal is to cease hostilities and ensure Ukraine's sovereignty, even if that means criticizing Ukrainian leadership.

For decades, the Hoover Institution stood as a conservatism's intellectual wing, but in 2025, it feels like a time capsule of a bygone era. Forty years ago, the Hoover Institution staffed the Reagan Revolution. Many of its leading scholars still champion aggressive foreign policy, believing that the American military must be used to shape the world. Even after the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan, Hoover’s scholars still push for more intervention, not less.

One particularly striking example came when Hoover-affiliated figures advocated for a dramatic increase in U.S. military aid to Ukraine, insisting that no settlement should leave Russian forces in place. This maximalist stance insisting on rejecting compromises and favoring intervention ignores the risk of a broader war, or even nuclear escalation, in favor of an idealized victory scenario.

Ferguson’s recent Ukraine critique follows the same tired script. He lambasts Trump and Vance for seeking a negotiated end to the war, dismissing realism as weakness. In Hoover’s world, it’s always 1938, every enemy is Hitler, and any restraint is “appeasement.” But outside the ivory tower, conservatives have become far more skeptical of interventionist crusades.

This isn’t just about Ukraine. 

Hoover has been out of sync with the conservative base for years. On trade and globalization, its economists cling to pre-Trump free-trade absolutism. One Hoover-published article recently called Trump’s tariffs a “tragedy” that undermines decades of progress. But GOP voters no longer buy the old gospel. After decades of offshoring and economic hollowing-out, today’s conservatives care more about factories at home than trade pacts abroad. Yet Hoover’s scholars still talk as if “protectionism” is heresy.

From foreign wars to trade policy, Hoover keeps defending a dead consensus. The Institution is still operating under the assumption that Republican voters will automatically back wars and globalist economics if wrapped in patriotic rhetoric. That assumption has collapsed under Trump. But Ferguson acts as if the assumption is true. 

The conservative movement has undergone a sea-change over the past decade. Trump’s rise in 2016 was the catalyst, but the transformation is much deeper than one individual. A new “America First” ethos has taken hold, one that is skeptical of foreign wars, wary of globalization, and focused on national interests. This isn’t a fringe phenomenon. Poll after poll shows that Republican support for Ukraine aid has collapsed. In early 2022, 80% of Republicans backed U.S. military assistance; by 2024, that number dropped to 45%. Even economic aid for Ukraine has fallen to just 40%. The party that once reflexively backed every foreign intervention is now openly questioning them.

And it’s not just voters—Republican politicians have adjusted too, with many GOP lawmakers now warning against “blank checks” to Ukraine. Other conservative institutions have adapted, too. The Heritage Foundation, once a hawkish stalwart, now emphasizes border security and foreign policy restraint. But Hoover? Hoover sounds like Washington from decades ago.

Throughout the mid-20th century, Hoover's scholars produced groundbreaking research that challenged prevailing paradigms and offered fresh perspectives on governance, economics, and international relations. Their work not only enriched academic discourse but also translated into actionable policies that shaped national and global strategies. This era of intellectual vigor and practical impact solidified Hoover's reputation as a powerhouse of bold, pragmatic conservatism. If Hoover wants to remain relevant, it must relearn the lessons of its own past.

Now at one-hundred-and-five years of age, Hoover must adapt. This doesn’t mean abandoning conservatism—but it does mean rethinking how conservative principles apply to 2025. Right now, the conservative movement is prioritizing strategic restraint, economic nationalism, and domestic security—not endless interventions and multinational trade deals.

Hoover’s best days were when it championed ideas that both reshaped American policy and stayed in touch with where policymakers and the public stood. It could be that again—but only if it stops rehashing yesterday’s playbook. If it doesn’t? Then Hoover becomes a museum of neoconservatism—a place for out-of-touch donors and think pieces that trend on Twitter but influence nothing in the real world.

The world has changed. The conservative movement has changed. It’s time for Hoover to catch up—or fade into irrelevance.

If anyone at the Hoover Institution would like to respond, please email eic@stanfordreview.org. To support the Review’s journalism, please donate at this link.